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We study the relation between gender and job performance among brokerage firm equity analysts.
Women's representation in analyst positions drops from 16% in 1995 to 13% in 2005. We find women
cover roughly 9 stocks on average compared to 10 for men. Women's earnings estimates tend to be
less accurate. After controlling for forecast characteristics, the difference in accuracy is roughly
equivalent to four years of experience. Despite reduced coverage and lower forecast accuracy, we
find women are significantly more likely to be designated as All-Stars, which suggests they outperform





















Despite the dramatic reduction in the gender income gap in recent decades, women 
remain underrepresented in many high-profile careers. Explanations for this phenomenon 
fall into two broad categories. One line of research emphasizes occupational self-
selection due to preferences or differences in abilities (e.g. Polachek, 1981 and Pitts, 
2003). Other researchers focus on discrimination in the workplace. Evidence of gender-
based discrimination has been documented in certain fields (e.g. Neumark, 1996 and 
Goldin and Rouse, 2000), yet employers’ attempts to offset bias through focused hiring 
strategies also raises concerns of reverse discrimination. Does the low representation of 
women in many high paying jobs reflect a lower “natural rate” due to preferences, or is it 
indicative of discrimination? Because of an emphasis on affirmative action, do employers 
reverse discriminate in order to attract more women for the job? 
This study examines the gender composition of sell-side stock analysts in 
investment banks and brokerages, and investigates whether employers either 
systematically discriminate based on gender, or generally attempt to promote gender 
balance through affirmative action. Sell-side analyst positions are well paying jobs where 
the average annual salary in 2005 was about $168,000,
1 which is well above the per 
capita income in the U.S. As with many jobs on Wall Street, a vast majority of analysts 
are males, and it is often alleged that women face gender discrimination in such high 
profile, well paying jobs. For instance, a 1996 class action law suit against Merrill Lynch 
contained over 900 complaints, representing roughly one third of the female brokers who 
worked at the company during the previous five years.
2 Concerns about potential 
                                                 
1 Source: CFA Institute survey.  
2 USA Today 9/15/2000. “Wall Street Battles Sexual Bias. Even as Brokerage Industry Fights 
Discrimination, women make accusations.” Smith Barney (now owned by Citigroup) and Morgan Stanley   2
discrimination have led many investment banks and other employers to institute hiring 
programs to promote diversity. For example, a 2001 survey of investment banks reports 
that roughly one third of large investment banks tie their reward systems to diversity 
initiatives. An even greater proportion of these banks also specify numerical objectives 
for affirmative action recruiting.
3 
Although issues of gender discrimination and affirmative action have attracted 
considerable attention, we find that the proportion of female stock analysts has 
progressively declined over time. For instance, the proportion of female analysts declined 
from roughly 16% in 1995 to 13% in 2005. It is important to determine whether this 
decline indicates growing discrimination or whether it reflects a shift in women’s career 
preferences. It is also important to understand whether employers’ attempts to achieve 
gender balance in the workforce compromise the effectiveness of their workforce. 
The essence of gender discrimination is that when faced with a choice between 
equally qualified men and women, employers prefer to hire men. As a result, gender 
discrimination leads to a higher hurdle being set for women, and hence women who are 
able to cross the hurdle would do a better job on average than their male counterparts. On 
the other hand, if affirmative action is an important factor in hiring decisions, then 
employers may set a lower hurdle for women to promote gender balance. If affirmative 
action based hiring is prevalent, women would on average perform worse than men. 
Investment banks are traditionally known for their competitive locker room 
mentality and 90-hour work weeks, which women may find less attractive in a general 
                                                                                                                                                 
also faced sex discrimination class action lawsuits in recent years that were backed by the U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission. 
3 Securities Industry Association, 2003, “Report on Diversity Strategy, Development and Demographics: 
Key Findings.”   3
sense but also for pragmatic family considerations. For example, Niederle and Vesterlund 
(2006) find experimental evidence that women dislike competitive environments whereas 
men tend to embrace them. If female equity analysts are relatively rare because women 
generally do not find that the job matches well with their preferences, then there would be 
no difference between the performance of women who do self-select into Wall Street 
careers and their male counterparts.  
We analyze the relation between gender and job performance to investigate 
whether discrimination and affirmative action are prevalently practiced. Previous 
research on gender and job performance is limited to manufacturing workers or relies on 
survey data.
4 Our study is innovative in that we are able to able to quantify job 
performance for thousands of highly paid professionals. Sell side security analysts are 
unique in that a key aspect of their job performance can be objectively measured and 
evaluated. Analysts’ earnings forecasts are an important component of their research 
reports that are emphasized by investors and form the basis for recognition in the media 
and among clients. Our analysis examines the role of gender on research output, forecast 
accuracy, and professional reputation as measured by the coveted All-American Research 
Team designation in Institutional Investor Magazine. 
There are a number of behavioral characteristics that may lead to gender 
differences in forecast accuracy. Research from cognitive psychology shows that people 
in general are overconfident about their abilities and that men tend to be more 
overconfident than women (e.g. Barber and Odean, 2001). As a result, men may be more 
willing to deviate from the consensus with their predictions which could lead to less 
                                                 
4 Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999) fit a production function to manufacturing data to estimate 
marginal productivity of labor by gender, and Holzer and Neumark (1999) rely on employer survey data to 
gauge job performance of affirmative action hires.   4
accurate forecasts on average. On the other hand, Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini 
(2003) find evidence that competition increases the performance of men but hinders the 
performance of women, which could provide men with an advantage in the competitive 
arena of investment banking. Moreover, Brown and Josephs (1999) show in experiments 
that the “mere suggestion of between-group differences can lead to a self-fulfilling 
prophecy in which the threat of failure promotes poor performance among the 
stigmatized.” The net effect of these behavioral influences on forecast accuracy is 
unclear. 
Our analysis of over 7900 investment bank security analysts reveals several 
striking findings. Women account for just 15.6% of analyst positions during our sample 
period, with a surprising downward trend from 16.1% in 1995 to 13.9% in 2005. Large 
brokerages are noticeably better at attracting women analysts. Women comprise 16.7% of 
analyst positions at the top decile of brokerages versus 13.7% at others. At the industry 
level, women’s representation is highest among analysts who follow companies in 
consumer staples industry (22.5%) and lowest among analysts who cover material 
companies (12.2%). Differences in employment longevity across gender are relatively 
small. Women are 3.3% more likely to leave their positions within two years, and for 
analysts who begin work during 1995-2005, women hold their jobs on average one month 
less than men. 
Women cover roughly one less company than men on average, nine stocks 
compared with ten covered by men. At the stock level, women and men analysts issue 
earnings forecasts with equal frequency. Previous research (e.g. Richardson, Teoh, and 
Wysocki 2003) shows that analysts initially make optimistic earnings forecasts and then   5
gradually decrease their estimates to a level the firm can beat by the end of the fiscal 
period. We find this pattern holds for both women and men, yet women exhibit 
consistently smaller optimism bias than men throughout the forecast period. The 
difference in optimism across gender could indicate less overconfidence among women 
or a greater desire among men to please the management of the firms they cover. 
Women’s earnings forecasts tend to be less accurate than men’s forecasts. After 
controlling for analysts’ and stock characteristics and forecast timing, the magnitude of 
the difference in accuracy between men and women is roughly equivalent to the effect of 
four years of experience. Despite covering fewer firms and lower forecast accuracy, we 
find women are significantly more likely to be designated as All-Stars by Institutional 
Investor  magazine. Membership on II’s All-American Research Team is based on 
thousands of institutional investor surveys and influences analysts’ compensation at many 
investment banks. The fact that women cover fewer stocks and are less accurate at 
earnings forecasts but are more likely to be designated as All-Stars suggests they may 
perform better at non-quantifiable aspects of the job such as client service. 
Taken together, our analysis of job performance supports the view that the low 
representation of women on Wall Street reflects differences in preferences or family 
considerations rather than discrimination by investment banks. While we do find 
significant differences in coverage, accuracy, and professional recognition across gender, 
the effects tend to be offsetting, which suggests neither gender-based discrimination nor 
affirmative action have a material impact on the quality of women analysts employed by 
brokerage firms.   6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the data and 
provides summary statistics. Section 2 provides evidence on the role of gender on job 
performance. Section 3 describes professional recognition across gender, and Section 4 
concludes. 
1. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We compile the data from several sources. We obtain data on brokerage firm 
analysts’ earnings forecasts for the period from 1995 to 2005 from I/B/E/S. The I/B/E/S 
detail files provide data on the security identity, the analyst’s identity, the brokerage 
house the analyst belongs to, forecast period information, and the earnings forecast and 
forecast date. We focus on quarterly earnings forecasts. The name of the analyst in 
I/B/E/S Broker Translation File is listed by last name and first initial. We match the 
analyst's information from I/B/E/S with data from the corresponding annual edition (plus 
or minus one year) of Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research which contains 
analysts' full name and contact information. 
We determine gender using the database on baby names from the Social Security 
Administration.
5 Of the 10,996 unique analyst names in I/B/E/S during the 1995-2005 
sample period, we are able to match 9,096 analysts with information from Nelson's 
Directory. We lose 247 observations due to duplicate last name and first initial (e.g. J. 
Smith in I/B/E/S could match with either Jennifer Smith or John Smith in Nelson's). We 
lose an additional 130 observations due to gender ambiguous first names such as Tracy. 
                                                 
5 http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/babynames. We examine the top 1000 baby names by gender each 
decade beginning in 1880 which results in 4,775 unique names. In order to increase the number of 
international names, we augment this list by adding additional data from www.behindthename.com, 
www.babynameindex.com, and www.wikipedia.org. With these additional sources, the number of unique 
names increase to 21,204. 
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Finally, for 773 observations we match names but are unable to determine gender 
because the names do not match the first names from any of our data sources.  
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for our resulting sample of 7,946 brokerage 
firm analysts. Analysts enter the sample in a given year if they make at least one 
quarterly earnings forecast in that year. The matching procedure is able to assign gender 
to over 70% of the full I/B/E/S sample. When data on first name is available from 
Nelson’s, our success at assigning gender is over 90%. 
In the full sample, women account for 15.6% of analyst positions, with an almost 
monotonic decrease from 16.1% in 1995 to 13.9% in 2005 as evident in Figure 1.
6 The 
downward trend is surprising since the general perception is that discrimination is on the 
decline and that employers now actively promote gender balance in their hiring policies. 
Perhaps representation was lower prior to 1995, but the finding suggests women's 
representation among sell side analysts has at best reached a plateau. 
Table 1 also presents the gender composition of analysts in large and small 
brokerages. We rank brokerages based on the number of analysts affiliated with that 
brokerage in the I/B/E/S database each year and categorize the top 10% of the brokerages 
as “large” and the rest as “small.” We find that women comprise 16.7% of analyst 
positions at large brokerages compared with 13.7% at other brokerages. Higher 
representation of women at large investment banks may reflect a greater emphasis on 
diversity as well as well as better working conditions. As noted earlier, large investment 
                                                 
6 For the full sample we average the percentages for each year. Without controlling for year, women’s 
representation in the full sample is 17.2%. This number is higher than the ratio in nine out of ten years, 
however, and it overstates women’s representation at any particular point in time because women leave the 
analysts’ position more often than men. To illustrate, in a balanced sample with two jobs if women work 
one year and men work two years, across two years there will be twice as many women as men in the 
sample.   8
banks are more likely to tie their reward systems to diversity initiatives. They may also be 
more likely to provide programs designed to address the needs of women. For example, 
Working Mother magazine currently lists several large investment banks on their list of 
best companies.
7 Evidence on job performance at top firms will help determine if the 
higher representation of women is due to their providing better working conditions or 
simply a result of quota based hiring. 
Table 1 also presents the proportion of women among analysts covering different 
sectors. We use the Global Industry Classification Standards (GICS) to classify firms into 
ten sectors. At the industry level, women’s representation is highest among analysts who 
follow companies in consumer staples (22.5%) and consumer discretionary (18.3%) 
industries. High representation in consumer oriented industries may be natural if these 
companies emphasize sales to women. Women analysts are least likely to cover 
companies in the materials (12.05%) and energy (12.1%) industries, which cater more to 
the industrial market than the consumer market. 
2. Gender and Job Performance among Sell-Side Analysts 
This section investigates whether on the job performance of sell-side analysts 
differs across gender.  Sell-side analysts’ job involves providing research and customer 
service to clients. We measure the performance of on the research side by examining the 
number of stocks that analysts follow, how frequently they revise their earnings forecasts 
and the accuracy of earnings forecasts for up to four quarters ahead. The number of 
stocks that analysts follow represents the workload that they carry. The frequency of 
                                                 
7 Factors that Working Mother considers in its choice of best companies to work include flexible work 
arrangements and favorable maternity/childcare support.   9
forecast revisions provides a measure of how closely analysts follow the stocks that they 
cover. 
Other aspects of customer service, such as keeping clients abreast of industry and 
firm-specific developments and arranging for meetings between investors and company 
management are highly valued by clients, but are hard to quantify. We capture theses 
aspects of performance using Institutional Investor’s All-American Research rankings. 
Institutional Investor conducts a comprehensive survey of thousands of portfolio 
managers, who are the most important brokerage customers, about the quality of service 
provided by analysts, and publishes an annual list of All-Star analysts. We use the All-
Star designation as a measure of analysts’ performance of the non-quantifiable aspects of 
the job. 
 2.1 Analyst coverage and employment longevity 
We begin with a look at number of stocks that each analyst covers. We calculate 
the number of stocks for which an analyst provides at least one one- to four-quarter ahead 
forecast in a particular calendar year as the workload carried by that analyst. Table 2 
presents the average number of stocks that analysts cover each calendar year, categorized 
by gender. Women cover fewer stocks in each year in the sample, covering 9.1 stocks on 
average compared to 10.5 for men. Looking across years, the career average for women 
is 12.7 stocks for women versus 16.2 for men. Thus, women appear less likely to take on 
coverage of new stocks than men. 
Table 2 shows that analysts at large brokerages tend to cover fewer stocks than 
analysts in smaller brokerages. In both large and small brokerages, women cover fewer 
stocks than men on average. Therefore, although women are more likely to work in larger   10
brokerages, the differences in stock coverage across gender are not explained by 
differences in the size of the employer. 
The finding that men cover more stocks indicates that men analysts carry a larger 
workload than women, which may reflect greater demands on women’s time away from 
work. Traditionally women have carried a bigger share of family responsibilities and a 
reduction in number of firms covered may be a natural way for women to accommodate 
greater demands on their time away from work (e.g. Becker, 1985). 
Table 2 also reports frequency of forecast revisions for one-quarter ahead 
forecasts within a fiscal quarter. Here the differences across gender are negligible. Each 
quarter for each stock, women issue 1.41 one-quarter ahead earnings forecasts on average 
whereas men issue 1.40 forecasts. Thus, at the stock level we observe no noticeable 
difference in forecast activity across gender. 
We also examine the timing of forecasts. Analysts use a variety of information to 
update their earnings estimates. Ivkovic and Jegadeesh (2004) note that forecast revisions 
that are made immediately following earnings announcements tend to reflect analysts’ 
interpretation of the firms’ earnings and other financial information firms release, while 
forecasts revisions at other points in time reflect information about the company that 
analysts independently gather. The empirical evidence in Ivkovic and Jegadeesh suggests 
that the information analysts independently gather is more informative for financial 
market participants than analysts’ interpretation of public information releases. 
Figure 2 presents the distribution of forecasts revisions around earnings 
announcement dates. Consistent with the evidence in Stickel (1996) and Ivkovic and 
Jegadeesh (2004), we find forecasts revisions by both men and women are concentrated   11
within the week after earnings announcements. However, figure 2 shows women are 
slightly more likely to issue forecasts in the weeks leading up to the announcement, 
which suggests women are more likely to rely on their independent research to revise 
their forecasts. 
Another important aspect of job performance is employment longevity. 
Investment banks expend considerable effort to develop and support equity analysts and 
would prefer to amortize these costs over longer horizons. Table 3 presents measures of 
employment longevity for new analysts who begin forecasting in a given calendar year. 
The table reports likelihood of leaving their job (i.e. stop forecasting), within one, two, 
and three years. The differences in longevity are relatively small. Women are 1.5% more 
likely to leave work within one year, 3.3% more likely to leave within two years, and 
2.8% more likely to leave within three years. Turning to average tenure, new women 
analysts hold their positions roughly one month less than men on average. We truncate 
the employment horizon to five years due to the relatively short sample period, which 
could underestimate differences in average tenure.
8 
2.2 Forecast accuracy 
Forecast accuracy is an important measure of equity analysts’ job performance. 
Earnings forecast is a key component of analyst research that is emphasized by investors 
and forecast accuracy forms an important basis for recognition in the media. Previous 
research (e.g. Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki 2003) documents initially optimistic 
                                                 
8 Hong and Kubik (2003) measure longevity differently and report that roughly 10% of analysts leave the 
sample within one year. They include all analysts in the I/B/E/S database and examine the number of years 
they remain in the database. We focus on analysts who newly enter the I/B/E/S data base in a given year 
and report the proportion of them who leave within a year. Our measure excludes analysts employed before 
1995, and it results in higher exit rates since experienced analysts are less likely to leave their jobs than 
new hires. Focusing on new hires is more appropriate for the purposes of this paper.   12
earnings forecasts that are gradually “walked down” throughout the fiscal period to a 
level that the firm can beat. One possible explanation for the initial optimism bias is that 
analysts tend to be overconfident about the stocks that they follow and overestimate 
future earnings. Another explanation is analysts deliberately produce optimistic forecasts 
in order to generate interest in the stock which stimulates trading and leads to brokerage 
commissions. 
Analysts tend to gradually reduce their optimistic forecasts as the earnings date 
approaches, resulting in mildly pessimistic forecasts on the date of the announcement. 
Previous research argues the phenomenon of beatable earnings targets is a result of 
guidance from firm management. Skinner and Sloan (2002) report that the stock price 
response to disappointing earnings is greater than the response to a similar positive 
surprise. They argue that this asymmetric stock price reaction gives managers an 
incentive to walk down their earnings guidance during the quarter and analysts follow 
managers’ guidance. Cotter, Tuna, and Wysocki (2006) find empirical support that 
analysts follow management's earning guidance, and Hutton (2005) documents that 
analyst forecasts that are guided by management are more accurate but tend to be more 
frequently pessimistic. 
We examine whether the optimism/pessimism bias are different across gender. 
We measure forecast error as ( ) ,, Forecast EPS / EPS ijt j j −  where  ,, Forecastijt is the 
forecast from analyst i for stock j on day t, and EPSj is the realized quarterly earnings 
per share. A positive forecast error indicates the forecast was optimistic and negative bias 
implies a pessimistic forecast. We exclude from the analysis observations where absolute 
value of EPS is less than 5 cents and Winsorize forecast errors at plus or minus 100%.    13
Table 4 presents the results for forecasts at different points in time around 
earnings announcements. The table shows that women’s forecasts are significantly less 
optimistic than men’s forecasts. Excluding forecasts following earnings announcements, 
when revisions may reflect a routine response to news, mean forecast errors are 0.9% for 
women compared with 1.7% for men. Both women and men exhibit optimism bias but 
women’s forecasts contain significantly smaller optimism bias. 
Partitioning the forecast sample by firm size using the NYSE median reveals that 
optimism bias is greater among small firms (2.2% for women versus 3.0% for men). For 
large firms the sign of the average bias differs across gender. Excluding announcement 
dates, women's forecasts for large firms are pessimistic on average (-0.34%) whereas 
men's forecasts tent to be optimistic (0.32%). Figure 3 plots the average forecast errors in 
event time around earnings announcements. The chart shows women’s forecasts contain 
smaller optimism bias throughout the fiscal quarter. The difference in optimism bias 
across gender could indicate less overconfidence among women or a greater desire 
among men to please the management of the firms they cover.  
  The next set of tests examines the absolute forecast accuracy of women and men. 
Forecast accuracy depends on a number of stock specific factors as well as the timing of 
the forecast relative to earnings announcement date. For example, forecasts are typically 
less accurate for small firms because less information is available to the market. Also, 
firms with greater earnings volatility tend to be harder to forecast, and thus forecast 
accuracy is negatively related to volatility. Forecasts also become more accurate when 
they are made closer to earnings announcements (e.g. Clement, 1999). When we evaluate 
the relative forecast accuracy across analysts, we need to control for these factors that are   14
exogenous to the analyst. Our first test of relative forecast accuracy controls for these 
factors by examining a matched sample where women and men issue earnings forecasts 
for the same stock on the same day.  
Table 5 presents a comparison of the characteristics of the matched sample and 
the full sample. We include one- to four-quarter ahead earnings forecasts in the sample. 
The matched sample contains all observations where at least one male and one female 
analyst issued a forecast for the same stock and fiscal quarter, on the same day. The 
matched sample contains 147,458 forecasts made by 1,084 women, and 345,687 forecasts 
made by 4,454 men. The matched sample represents about 70% of the analysts and 17% 
of the earnings forecasts from the full sample. 
Table 5 also presents the average size decile rank of the firms in the matched 
sample and the full sample. We assign a size decile ranks based on the size distribution of 
stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). We assign a rank of 1 to firms in 
the smallest size decile, 2 to the next size decile and so on. The mean NYSE size decile is 
4.98 for the matched sample versus 3.45 for the full sample. Since the matched sample 
requires forecasts from two analysts on the same day, stocks in this sample tend to be 
larger than the stocks in the full sample.  
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where  ,, Forecast fj t  is the quarterly earnings forecast made by female analyst f for stock j 
on day t, and EPSj is the realized earnings per share for the stock. F is the number of 
forecasts by female analysts on day t and M is the number of forecasts by male analysts   15
on day t. When there are forecasts made by either multiple female analysts or multiple 
male analysts, we consider each forecast as a separate observation. A positive relative 
forecast error indicates than women’s earnings estimates are less accurate. 
Table 6 reports average relative forecast errors for the matched sample.
9 Across 
forecasts horizons the relative error is 0.11%. As we discussed earlier, forecasts that 
analysts issue immediately after earnings announcement tend to present analysts’ 
interpretation of financial data released by the company, while earnings forecasts made 
on other days tend to use information that analysts’ privately gather. Table 6 also 
separately reports the relative accuracy of forecasts made on the earnings announcement 
day and the following day, and the accuracy of forecasts made on other days. The 
forecasts made immediately after earnings announcement are about equally accurate 
equal across gender, but women’s forecasts on other days are about 0.19% less accurate. 
When partitioning the sample by forecast horizon, the results are only statistically 
significant for two and three quarters ahead forecasts. 
Differences in forecast accuracy may be explained by differences in experience or 
other analyst characteristics. We examine the relation between gender and forecast 
accuracy while controlling for forecast characteristics using the regression approach 












=    (2) 
where  ,, ijt AFE  is the absolute forecast error for analyst i’s forecast of firm j for quarter t, 
and  , jt AFE  is the mean absolute forecast error for firm j for period t across all analysts. 
                                                 
9 Table 6 reports fewer observations than Table 5. Table 6 analyzes forecast days averaged across analysts 
whereas Table 5 reports the number of individual forecasts.   16
PMAFE represents analyst i’s proportional forecast error relative to the average of the 
analysts absolute forecast errors for firm j in quarter t. Positive values of PMAFE reflect 
worse than average performance and negative values reflect better than average 
performance. We Winsorize PMAFE at 100%. 
 PMAFE  controls for firm and quarter effects by adjusting errors by their related 
firm-quarter means. Firm-quarter effects allow for the difficulty of predicting earnings to 
vary over time, which may occur due to corporate events such as mergers or acquisitions 
or more simply due to changes in managements’ earning guidance. 
  We then regress the proportional forecast errors on analyst characteristics 
according to the following specification: 
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 (3) 
,, ijt AGE  is the number of days between the forecast date and the earnings announcement 
date, and it measures forecast staleness.  , it GEXP  measures the general experience of the 
analyst, and it equals the number of years analyst i has supplied at least one forecast on 
I/B/E/S up to quarter t.  ,, ijt FEXP  is a firm-specific measure of the analyst's experience 
and it equals the number of years analyst i has made at least one forecast for firm j up to 
quarter t.  , it NCOS  and  , it NGIC  are the number of companies and industries (measured by 
two-digit GIC code) followed by the analyst, and they reflect the complexity of the 
analyst’s portfolio.  , 10it TOP  is 1 if the analyst is employed by a Top decile brokerage 
firm (by number of analysts employed) and it captures differences access to brokerage 
firm resources.  , it ALLSTAR  is 1 if the analyst is a member of Institutional Investor’s All-  17
American Research Team in year t-1. Finally,  i GENDER  is 1 if the analyst is female and 
0 if male. Similar to PMAFE, we adjust the independent variables by subtracting firm-
quarter means. The resulting model takes the form  ( ) ,, , ,, , ijt jt ijt jt yyxx b −= − .
10 
Table 7 reports the regression results. Across horizons, women produce 
proportional forecast errors that are 0.49% higher than men. Controlling for analyst 
characteristics produces larger differences in accuracy across gender than the univariate 
results in Table 6. For example, women are more likely to cover fewer stocks and work at 
top brokerage firms. These characteristics typically lead to more accurate forecasts and 
thus in the regression framework women are held to a higher standard. 
The regression framework also provides a means to interpret the economic 
significance of the result. For example, the difference in accuracy across gender is on par 
with the incremental accuracy exhibited by All Star analysts (-0.41%) and is roughly 
equivalent to the effects of four years of firm specific experience (-0.52). The results are 
generally consistent when the sample is broken down by forecast quarter, and are 
stronger when examining the matched sample. 
  Taken together, the findings in this section indicate that women tend to produce 
less optimistic forecasts than men, and their forecasts tend to be less accurate than the 
forecasts of male analysts. The difference in accuracy is not large, but is similar in 
magnitude to the effects of other analyst characteristics examined in the literature such as 
experience and All-Star status. 
3. Gender and Professional Recognition among Sell-Side Analysts 
                                                 
10 The approach is similar to using firm-year dummies to control for firm-year effects. See Clement (1999) 
for more details.    18
  The previous section documents differences across gender in stock coverage, 
employment longevity, and forecast accuracy. In this section we present an additional 
measure of job performance that captures non-quantifiable aspects of performance. 
It is difficult to objectively measure qualitative aspects of job performance across 
employees from a number of different organizations. Fortunately, for brokerage firm 
analysts, Institutional Investor magazine (II) surveys roughly 2000 institutional investors 
each summer for their opinions on sell-side analysts. Based on the survey, II publishes a 
list of analysts that it designates as members of the All-American Research Team (All-
Stars) each year in its October issue. 
Institutional investors are the most important customers of sell-side analysts. 
Money management firms typically allocate their soft dollar commissions based on their 
internal surveys about the research services of various brokerages. The II survey 
represents the collective opinions of these brokerage clients, and in fact Stickel (1992) 
reports that brokerage houses base analysts’ compensation on their All-Star status. 
Therefore, we use II  All-Star designation by brokerages as our measure of analysts’ 
overall job performance. 
We examine whether the likelihood of All-Star status varies by gender, after 
controlling for other factors. We utilize a logistic regression to examine the determinants 
of All-Star status. In addition to the analyst characteristics in Equation (3), we include a 
measure of relative forecast accuracy similar to Hong and Kubik (2003). Each quarter for 
each stock analysts are ranked according to their absolute forecast errors using the 
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 (4) 
where Rank equals 1 (2) for the analyst who produces the best (second best) quarterly 
forecast for firm j in quarter t, etc., and Number of Analystsj,t is the number of analysts 
who cover the firm in quarter t. An analyst with a rank of 1 receives a score of 100; the 
least accurate analyst receives a score of 0. We assign scores only when at least two 
analysts make earnings forecast for a particular fiscal quarter. Measuring accuracy in this 
way controls for differences in difficulty in forecasting earnings across firms. We average 
quarterly accuracy scores across stocks over the last three years as of March each year, 
and use this as our measure of accuracy  , it ACCURACY  for analyst i in year t. The 
resulting logistic regression specification is: 
 
,0 1 ,2 , 3 ,
4, 5 , 7
...
10 .
it it it it
it it i
ALLSTAR b bGEXP b NCOS b NGIC
b TOP b ACCURACY b GENDER
=+ + + +
++ +
 (5) 
In addition to a measure of forecast accuracy, we include the analyst characteristics from 
Equation (3).  The link between employer status as a top decile brokerage firm and all-
star membership is ambiguous. Analysts who work at large brokerage firms tend to be 
more visible which could help make them all-stars. On the other hand, large firms tend to 
attract better analysts in which case they could naturally become all-stars. Thus, Table 8 
presents the results with and without TOP10. 
  Unconditionally, the likelihood of being an All-Star for women is 8.78% versus 
7.99% for men. The logistic results in Table 8 confirm this disparity. After controlling for 
experience and accuracy, being a women analyst raises the marginal likelihood of All-
Star status by 2.36%. Further controlling for employer status reduces the incremental   20
probability to 1.04%. Expressed in terms of the unconditional likelihood, being a woman 
raises the chances of being designated as an All-Star by Institutional Investor magazine 
by more than 10 percent. 
  The fact that women cover fewer stocks and are less accurate at earnings forecasts 
but are more likely to be designated as All-Stars suggests they perform better at non-
quantifiable aspects of performance such as client service. In addition to research reports, 
analyst attributes surveyed as important by institutional investors include industry 
knowledge, integrity, responsiveness, management access, communication skills, and 
management of conflicts of interest (see Johnson, 2005). Some criticize the rankings as 
having a popularity contest element to them (e.g. Emery and Li, 2005), and to the extent 
that women are relatively rare it may improve their visibility among clients. However, 
greater visibility among market participants may have real effects on job performance 
such as better access to firm management. 
4. Conclusions 
  Women have historically been underrepresented in many high profile and 
lucrative careers. The reasons for such under representation range from differences in 
preferences and abilities to gender discrimination. Many employers have instituted 
affirmative action programs to encourage gender balance in hiring decisions.  
This paper examines the gender composition and job performance of sell-side 
analysts. Our study investigates the relative abilities across gender on various aspects of a 
sell-side analysts’ job and sheds light on whether gender discrimination or affirmative 
action are evident in on the job performance.    21
We find women cover roughly one less stock than men, and tend to forecast less 
accurately on average than their male counterparts. On the other hand, after controlling 
for experience and accuracy, we find women significantly are more likely to be 
designated by Institutional Investor magazine as members of the All-American Research 
Team which indicates women may be better at non-quantifiable aspects of job 
performance such as client service. 
  Taken together, our analysis supports the view that the low representation of 
women on Wall Street reflects differences in preferences rather than discrimination by 
investment banks. While we do find significant differences in performance across gender, 
the effects tend to be offsetting which indicates neither gender-based discrimination nor 
affirmative action have a material impact on the quality of women analysts employed by 
brokerage firms.  
While critics often argue that affirmative action programs set lower standard for 
preferred groups, our findings do not support this view. However, we also find that any 
affirmative action programs for analysts that are currently in place are not effective in 
promoting gender balance since the proportion of female analysts have gradually 
declined over time. To the extent that lower female representation reflects greater 
demands on their time due to family obligation, improvements in working conditions, 
such as greater flexibility in work loads and enhanced childcare options, will open the 
door to greater participation by women. Also, greater emphasis on the qualitative factors 
of job performance emphasized in the All-Star surveys would enhance gender balance.  
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Table 1              
Financial Analysts Employed at Investment Brokerage Firms 
  All Brokerage Firms    Top Decile Brokerage Firms    Other Firms 
   Percentage      Percentage      Percentage 
 Number  Women  Men    Number  Women  Men    Number  Women  Men 
1995  1,857  16.10  83.90 1,013  18.46  81.54 1,012  13.93  86.07 
1996  2,137  16.66  83.34 1,197  18.80  81.20 1,133  13.42  86.58 
1997  2,560  17.15  82.85 1,463  18.87  81.13 1,357  13.71  86.29 
1998  2,896  16.61  83.39 1,706  17.64  82.36 1,454  14.72  85.28 
1999  3,107  16.06  83.94 1,853  17.05  82.95 1,593  14.63  85.37 
2000  3,159  16.14  83.86 1,927  17.02  82.98 1,540  14.03  85.97 
2001  3,350  16.09  83.91 2,075  16.87  83.13 1,607  13.88  86.12 
2002  3,160  15.25  84.75 1,941  15.97  84.03 1,486  13.53  86.47 
2003  3,154  14.39  85.61 1,898  14.96  85.04 1,468  12.87  87.13 
2004  3,230  13.65  86.35 1,989  14.08  85.92 1,476  11.99  88.01 
2005  3,289  13.86  86.14 2,029  13.85  86.15 1,488  13.44  86.56 
Full  Sample  7,946  15.63  84.37 5,051  16.69  83.31 5,136  13.65  86.35 
                    
Industry                    
  Energy  649  12.17  87.83  419  14.08  85.92  399  9.52  90.48 
  Materials  863  12.05  87.95  482  12.45  87.55  565  9.73  90.27 
  Industrials  2,018  12.74  87.26  1,170  13.93  86.07  1,177  10.54  89.46 
  Consumer Discretionary  2,364  18.32  81.68  1,416  19.70  80.30  1,419  15.72  84.28 
  Consumer Staples  786  22.52  77.48  441  24.94  75.06  446  19.51  80.49 
  Health Care  1,440  17.29  82.71  791  18.58  81.42  923  15.60  84.40 
  Financials  1,273  16.26  83.74  783  16.99  83.01  731  13.95  86.05 
  Information Technology  2,902  12.96  87.04  1,778  13.50  86.50  1,794  10.93  89.07 
  Telecommunication Services  617  12.48  87.52  409  11.98  88.02  324  10.80  89.20 
  Utilities  285  16.84  83.16  175  17.14  82.86  156  16.67  83.33 
The table reports the average number of analysts and percentages by gender for analysts employed at investment brokerage firms. Number is the number 
of analysts for which we are able to assign gender. Unasgnd refers to the percentage of I/B/E/S analysts for which we are unable to assign gender. The 
data is obtained from I/B/E/S and Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research. Industries are classified using Global Industry Classification Standards 
(GIGS). Top Decile Brokerage Firms refers to firms that employ the most analysts.   25
 
Table 2                 
Gender and Job Performance: Stock Coverage and Forecast Frequency 
  Average Number of Stocks Followed by Analysts    Frequency of Forecast Revisions 
  All Brokers  Top Brokers  Other Brokers    All Brokers  Top Brokers  Other Brokers 
  Women Men Women Men Women Men   Women Men Women Men Women Men 
1995  10.54 11.84 11.18 12.43  7.98  9.77    1.34  1.34  1.32  1.34  1.31  1.30 
1996  9.80 11.50 10.27 12.33  8.03  9.00    1.33  1.33  1.33  1.35  1.30  1.26 
1997  8.78  11.08 9.63  11.76 6.72 8.71    1.31  1.31  1.31  1.31  1.25  1.26 
1998  9.10 10.60 10.05 11.36  6.57  8.10    1.37  1.38  1.38  1.40  1.30  1.31 
1999  9.16 10.58 10.19 11.52  6.42  7.87    1.35  1.37  1.35  1.36  1.27  1.31 
2000  9.08 9.90 9.98  10.76 6.82 7.38    1.34  1.36  1.35  1.34  1.27  1.33 
2001  8.54 9.54 8.94  10.09 6.83 7.35    1.46  1.48  1.49  1.48  1.35  1.40 
2002  8.44 9.74 8.98  10.48 6.70 7.42    1.43  1.42  1.45  1.41  1.35  1.36 
2003  8.57 9.80 8.91  10.69 7.47 7.60    1.50  1.47  1.54  1.47  1.38  1.40 
2004  8.85  10.20 9.56  11.32 7.02 7.42    1.56  1.49  1.60  1.50  1.43  1.42 
2005  9.08  10.49 9.70  11.46 7.43 7.99    1.51  1.47  1.52  1.45  1.43  1.45 
Yearly Average  9.09  10.48 9.76  11.29 7.09 8.06  1.41  1.40  1.42  1.40  1.33  1.34 
Career Average  12.69 16.23 13.20 16.47  9.21 11.51    1.42  1.41  1.43  1.41  1.34  1.35 
The table reports the average number of stocks covered by analysts and the frequency of forecast revisions by gender for analysts employed at investment 
brokerage firms. The data is obtained from I/B/E/S and Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research. Industries are classified using Global Industry Classification 
Standards (GIGS). Top Brokers refers to the top decile brokerage firms that employ the most analysts. Yearly Average designates the average across years. 
Career Average is the average number of stocks an analyst follows throughout the sample period. 
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Table 3    
Gender and Employment Longevity for Financial Analysts at Brokerage Firms 
  Number of  Percentage that  Percentage that  Percentage that   
  New Analysts  Leave within 1 year  Leave within 2 years  Leave within 3 years  Average Tenure 
  Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men 
1995  116  570  21.55 18.25 37.07 42.63 62.07 60.18  3.08  3.07 
1996  132  717  23.48 19.11 49.24 46.44 71.21 64.30  2.76  2.95 
1997  194  984  24.23 22.76 48.97 41.46 63.92 62.80  2.85  2.97 
1998  212 1,090  25.00 25.96 56.13 48.72 70.75 67.98  2.63  2.79 
1999  208 1,108  27.40 27.80 53.85 54.60 73.56 69.95  2.63  2.67 
2000  195 1,082  23.08 26.71 54.87 53.14 70.77 68.58  2.73  2.73 
2001  228 1,320  32.46 32.65 64.04 60.30 75.88 73.71  2.45  2.53 
2002  189 1,046  33.33 29.73 57.67 54.21 69.31 68.83  .  . 
2003  204 1,229  32.84 28.97 52.45 49.63 72.06 66.23  .  . 
2004  162 1,146  25.31 21.29 57.41 49.39  .  .  .  . 
2005  166  940  32.53  27.98  . . . . . . 
Full  Sample  2,006  11,232  27.77 26.26 54.13 50.86 70.44 67.65  2.70  2.78 
The table reports measures of employment longevity for brokerage firm equity analysts. The data is obtained from I/B/E/S and Nelson’s 
Directory of Investment Research. Entry and exit into the employment position is measured by the starting and stopping of forecasting 
earnings. Average tenure is truncated at 5 years. 
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Table 4 
Gender and Bias in Earnings Forecasts 
  All Firms  Small Stocks  Large Stocks 
Days Relative  No. of  Forecast Bias    No. of  Forecast Bias    No. of   Forecast Bias   
to Earnings Date  Forecasts  Women Men p-value  Forecasts Women Men p-value  Forecasts Women Men p-value 
-30 to -26  38,143  0.67 1.24 0.22 13,537  2.02 2.57 0.54  22,592  -0.44 0.16 0.25 
-25 to -21  49,407  -0.07 0.92 0.01 16,736  0.23 2.27 0.01 30,247  -0.79 -0.09 0.09 
-20 to -16  54,098  -0.93 -0.62 0.37 18,738  -0.59 0.52 0.12 32,427  -1.20 -1.58 0.32 
-15 to -11  58,771  -1.66 -1.38 0.39 19,575  -1.74 -0.76 0.14 35,520  -2.26 -2.31 0.90 
-10 to -6  59,563  -2.42 -2.07 0.23 19,228  -2.28 -1.73 0.38 36,289  -2.72 -2.83 0.72 
-5 to -1  49,180  -2.05 -2.15 0.75 14,621  -2.42 -2.59 0.83 28,794  -3.08 -2.68 0.22 
 0  39,306  1.94 2.14 0.68 14,131  3.96 3.97 0.99  23,103  0.83 0.72 0.83 
 1  228,938  1.25 0.99 0.21 82,769  2.87 2.45 0.33  137,789  0.12 -0.15 0.21 
 2 to 6  191,202  2.89 3.39 0.04 82,867  4.11 4.45 0.45  98,217  1.19 1.96 0.01 
 7 to 11  49,727  2.75 3.83 0.03 21,815  4.83 5.08 0.79  24,515  0.45 2.01 0.00 
 12 to 6  41,282  2.60 4.23 0.00 16,973  4.53 5.95 0.13  21,576  1.21 2.32 0.06 
 17 to 21  40,954  2.90 3.60 0.19 16,345  5.56 5.29 0.78  21,943  1.27 1.91 0.29 
 22 to 26  42,913  2.46 3.29 0.10 16,530  4.95 4.25 0.47  23,602  0.50 2.20 0.00 
 27 to 32  56,324  1.76 3.03 0.00 20,940  2.45 4.55 0.01  31,741  0.96 1.69 0.13 
All Except Day 0  960,502  1.00 1.51  <.0001  360,674  2.37 2.88 0.01  545,252  -0.23 0.20  <.0001 
All Except Day 0, 1  731,564  0.92 1.68  <.0001  277,905  2.22 3.01 0.00  407,463  -0.34 0.32  <.0001 
The table reports a measure of forecast optimism in the earnings forecasts of brokerage firm analysts. Forecast bias is measured as (Forecast – EPS)/EPS, where 
Forecast is the one-quarter ahead quarterly earnings forecast and EPS is the realized earnings per share. p-values reflect t-tests for difference in means and are 
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Table 5 
Characteristics of Analyst Earnings Forecasts  
 Matched  Sample  Full  Sample 
  Number of Analysts  Number of Forecasts Stock  Number  of  Forecasts Stock 
  Women Men Women Men  Size  Women Men  Size 
  1995  230  787  3,306  4,296  6.81  20,832  132,662  3.97 
  1996  264  912  3,987  5,824  6.55  22,801  143,539  3.91 
  1997  323  1,076  5,118  8,085  6.39  24,884  167,550  3.76 
  1998  388  1,483  9,252  16,158  5.91  32,997  209,671  3.73 
  1999  397  1,689  11,666  22,335  6.17  33,520  224,909  4.05 
  2000  420  1,830  13,230  28,782  6.44  32,272  198,441  4.50 
  2001  459  1,965  19,733  45,412  6.00  41,798  263,947  4.20 
  2002  404  1,904  18,660  47,023  5.81  37,607  257,614  4.07 
  2003  358  1,834  18,534  47,872  5.77  39,973  281,775  4.04 
  2004  352  1,856  21,473  58,416  5.54  42,642  326,744  3.89 
  2005  363  1,813  22,499  61,484  5.36  45,715  349,322  3.73 
Full Sample  1,084  4,454  147,458  345,687  4.97  375,041  2,556,174  3.43 
The table reports characteristics of brokerage firm analyst earnings forecasts. In the Matched Sample, forecasts of 
quarterly earnings from women analysts are matched with forecasts from men analysts for the same stock on the 
same day. Stock size is the average size decile based on NYSE breakpoints. The analyst data is from I/B/E/S and 
Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research. 
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Table 6     
Gender and Earnings Forecast Errors 
All Earnings  Not  Earnings 
Panel A: All Horizons  Days  Date  Date 
    Number of Observations  108,220 51,643  56,577 
    Relative Forecast Error  0.11 0.03 0.19 
    p-value  0.01 0.63 0.00 
     
Panel B: Fiscal Quarters     
One quarter ahead     
    Number of Observations  44,622 19,631 24,991 
    Relative Forecast Error  0.04 -0.05  0.11 
    p-value  0.51   0.57  0.22 
     
Two quarters ahead     
    Number of Observations  27,975 13,653 14,322 
    Relative Forecast Error  0.25 0.12 0.37 
    p-value  0.00 0.29 0.00 
     
Three quarters ahead     
    Number of Observations  20,909 10,628 10,281 
    Relative Forecast Error  0.18 0.03 0.33 
    p-value  0.07 0.80 0.03 
     
Four quarters ahead     
    Number of Observations  14,714 7,731  6,983 
    Relative Forecast Error  -0.04 0.05  -0.13 
    p-value  0.76 0.74 0.49 
The table reports the difference between the earnings forecast errors for women and men
brokerage analysts. Forecasts are matched across gender by stock and day and absolute errors are
measured as |(Forecast – EPS)/EPS|, where EPS is the realized earnings per share. Earnings Date 
indicates days 0 and 1 following earnings announcement dates. Panel A reports the results for all
quarterly forecast horizons, and Panel B partitions the results by forecast quarter. t-test p-values 
are rounded ton two digits. The analyst data is from I/B/E/S and Nelson’s Directory of Investment 
Research, and covers 1995-2005. 
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Table 7               
Characteristics of Earnings Forecast Errors       
  All Horizons  1 quarter ahead  2 quarter ahead  3 quarter ahead  4 quarter ahead 
Variable  Estimate  p-value  Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Panel A: Full Sample 
Intercept  -3.34  0.00 -5.46 0.00  -2.62 0.00  -1.91 0.00  -1.60 0.00 
AGE  0.55  0.00  0.89 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.23 0.00 
GEXP  0.03  0.01  0.03 0.12 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.99  -0.02 0.28 
FEXP  -0.13  0.00 -0.26 0.00  -0.09 0.00  -0.04 0.19 0.06 0.08 
NCOS  0.05  0.00  0.09 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 
NGIC  0.34  0.00  0.50 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.27 0.01  -0.02 0.84 
TOP-BRK  -2.38  0.00 -3.73 0.00  -2.18 0.00  -1.67 0.00  -1.30 0.00 
ALL-STAR  -0.41  0.00 -0.49 0.01  -0.51 0.02 0.12 0.60  -0.57 0.03 
GENDER  0.49  0.00  0.23 0.24 0.93 0.00 0.52 0.02 0.49 0.04 
N  2,669,152   970,980  696,114  561,348  440,710   
Adj R-Sq  0.04   0.08  0.03  0.01  0.01   
       
Panel B: Matched Sample         
Intercept  -10.43  0.00  -16.22  0.00 -7.10  0.00 -4.59  0.00 -3.86  0.00 
AGE  1.03  0.00  1.55 0.00 0.74 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.37 0.00 
GEXP  0.02  0.29  0.01 0.72 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.68  -0.02 0.73 
FEXP  -0.05  0.15 -0.12 0.03  -0.06 0.31 0.07 0.32 0.08 0.33 
NCOS  0.06  0.00  0.08 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.44 0.05 0.14 
NGIC  0.11  0.41  0.19 0.36  -0.06 0.80 0.27 0.31  -0.10 0.74 
TOP-BRK  -2.25  0.00 -3.44 0.00  -2.00 0.00  -1.20 0.00  -1.10 0.01 
ALL-STAR  -0.74  0.00 -0.81 0.04  -1.42 0.00  -0.43 0.40  -0.26 0.67 
GENDER  1.45  0.00  1.81 0.00 1.77 0.00 0.81 0.02 0.43 0.29 
N  460,598    192,467  118,937   87,069    62,125   
Adj R-Sq  0.08   0.16  0.05  0.02  0.01   
Absolute forecast errors, measured as |(Forecast – EPS)/EPS|, are regressed on forecast characteristics. In the Matched Sample forecasts are matched across 
gender by stock and day. AGE is a measure of staleness for the forecast, GEXP and FEXP is the number of years the analyst has issued forecasts (forecasts for 
the stock in question), NCOS and NGICS are the number of companies and industries followed by the analyst. TOP-BRK is 1 if the analyst works at a top decile 
brokerage firm by number of analysts, and ALL-STAR is 1 if the analyst is designated as an All-Star by Institutional Investor magazine, and GENDER is 1 if the 
analyst is a woman. p-values are rounded to two digits. The analyst forecast data is from I/B/E/S and Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research, and covers 
1995-2005.   31
Table 8          
Gender and All-Star Designation Among Brokerage Analysts 
Variable Estimate  p-value 
Marginal 
Effects (%)  Estimate p-value 
Marginal 
Effects (%) 
  Intercept  -4.34  0.00    -6.66  0.00   
  GEXP  0.11  0.00  0.82  0.11  0.00  0.47 
  NCOS  0.06  0.00  0.46  0.06  0.00  0.24 
  NGIC  -0.29  0.00  -2.12  -0.17  0.00  -0.72 
  ACCURACY  0.02  0.00  0.13  0.01  0.00  0.06 
  GENDER  0.29  0.02  2.36  0.23  0.05  1.04 
  TOP-BRK  .  .  .  2.85  0.00  11.79 
N 28,157      25,211    
Pseudo R2   0.095    0.193    
The table reports the results of logistic regressions of All-Star status on analyst characteristics. All-Star 
status reflects membership in Institutional Investor magazine’s All-American Research Team. GEXP is 
the number of years experience the analyst has at issuing forecasts. NCOS and NGICS are the number of 
companies and industries followed by the analyst. TOP-BRK is 1 if the analyst works at a top decile 
brokerage firm by number of analysts. ACCURACY is the average forecast accuracy rank across 
analysts for the stocks the analyst covers. GENDER is 1 if the analyst is a woman. Standard errors are 
clustered by analysts and the resulting p-values are reported next to each coefficient. The analyst data is 
from I/B/E/S and Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research. The sample period covers 1995-2005. 
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Figure 1 
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The chart plots the average percentage of women employed as financial analysts at investment brokerage firms. The 
data is obtained from I/B/E/S and Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research. Top Decile Brokerage Firms refers to 
firms which employ the most analysts.   33
Figure 2 
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The chart plots the distribution of earnings forecasts around announcement dates (day 0).  The data is from I/B/E/S 
and the sample period covers 1995 through 2005.   34
Figure 3 






























































































































The chart shows optimism in the earnings forecasts of brokerage firm analysts. Forecast bias is measured as 
(Forecast – EPS)/EPS, where Forecast is the one-quarter ahead quarterly earnings forecast and EPS is the realized 
earnings per share. The analyst data is from I/B/E/S and Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research and covers 
1995-2005. 
 
 